Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1989

Shirley Gillmor v. Dennis K. Wright, Sara C.
Wright, David L. Wright, Rona R. Wright : Reply
Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Richard C. Skeen, R. Stephen Marshall; Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy; D. Gilbert Athay;
attorneys for respondents.
James B. Lee, John B. Wilson; Parsons, Behle & Latimer; attorneys for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Shirley Gillmor v. Dennis K. Wright, Sara C. Wright, David L. Wright, Rona R. Wright, No. 890257.00 (Utah Supreme Court,
1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2627

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

crw»?
DOCUMENT
KFU

UTAH SUPREME COURT
BRIEF.

45.9
.S9
DOCKET m>

THE SURBSME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SHIRLEY GILLMOR, as Personal
Representative of the Estate
of Stephen T. Gillmor,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
DENNIS K. WRIGHT, SARA C.
WRIGHT, DAVID L. WRIGHT,
RONA R. WRIGHT,

Case No. 890257
Priority No. 16

Defendants-Respondents/
Cross-Appellants,
and
CHARLES F. GILLMOR,
EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR,
Intervenor-DefendantsRespondents/Cross-Appellants,
REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR
On Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court of Summit County
Honorable Michael R. Murphy, District Judge
JAMES B. LEE (1919)
JOHN B. WILSON (3511)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Appellant
Shirley Gillmor
185 South State St. , Ste. 700
P. 0. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
D. GILBERT ATHAY
Attorneys for Cross-Appellants
Wrights, Charles F. Gillmor
72 East 400 South
Suite 325
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

RICHARD C. SKEEN (2971)
R. STEPHEN MARSHALL (2097)
of and for
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
& MCCARTHY
Attorneys for Cross-Appellant
Edward Leslie Gillmor
50 So. Main St., Ste. 1600
P. O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone:
(801) 532-3333

JAN 2 5 W91
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SHIRLEY GILLMOR, as Personal
Representative of the Estate
of Stephen T. Gillmor,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
DENNIS K. WRIGHT, SARA C.
WRIGHT, DAVID L. WRIGHT,
RONA R. WRIGHT,

Case No. 890257
Priority No. 16

Defendants-Respondents/
Cross-Appellants,
and
CHARLES F. GILLMOR,
EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR,
Intervenor-DefendantsRespondents/Cross-Appellants,
REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR
On Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court of Summit County
Honorable Michael R. Murphy, District Judge
JAMES B. LEE (1919)
JOHN B. WILSON (3511)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Appellant
Shirley Gillmor
185 South State St., Ste. 700
P. 0. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
D. GILBERT ATHAY
Attorneys for Cross-Appellants
Wrights, Charles F. Gillmor
72 East 400 South
Suite 325
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

RICHARD C. SKEEN (2971)
R. STEPHEN MARSHALL (2097)
of and for
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
& MCCARTHY
Attorneys for Cross-Appellant
Edward Leslie Gillmor
50 So. Main St., Ste. 1600
P. O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone:
(801) 532-3333

TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1

ARGUMENT

2

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING EDWARD L.
GILLMOR' S CLAIM TO REFORM OR CORRECT THE
DESCRIPTION OF THE SAWMILL CANYON ROAD IN THE
PARTITION DECREE
A.

The trial court' s finding that the
court in the Partition Action did
not intend to award him and Charles
F. Gillmor an easement over Shirley
Gillmor' s land is clearly
erroneous
1.
2.

B.
C.
II.

2

2

The evidence in support of the trial
court' s finding

3

The evidence against the trial court' s
finding

6

Shirley Gillmor misconstrues this Court' s
decision in St. Pierre v. Edmonds

16

Edward L. Gillmor' s independent action in
equity is not barred by laches

21

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT EDWARD
L. GILLMOR WAS NOT ENTITLED TO AN EASEMENT BY
IMPLICATION OR BY NECESSITY ACROSS SHIRLEY
GILLMOR' S PROPERTY

24

CONCLUSION

28

ADDENDUM

29

G \WPL\088\00000QD2 W51

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Eaan v. Ecran. 560 P. 2d 704, 705-06 (Utah 1977) . . . .
Gillmor v. Gillmor. 637 P. 2d at 737

17-19
7, 9

Lane v. Messer, 731 P. 2d 488, 491 (Utah 1986)

22

Laub v. South Central Utah Telephone Assoc. . Inc. .
657 P. 2d 1304, 1306 (Utah 1982)

23

Ney v. Harrison. 5 Utah 2d 217, 299
P. 2d 1114, 1116 (1956)

17-19

Papinikolas Brothers Enterprises v. Sugarhouse
Shopping Center Associates. 535 P. 2d 1256, 1260
(Utah 1975)
St. Pierre v. Edmonds. 645 P. 2d 615
(Utah 1987)

22
16-19, 22, 23

State of Wisconsin v. State of Michigan. 295
U.S. 455, 55 S. Ct. 786, 79 L.Ed. 1541 (1935)

19

Stewart v. Sullivan. 29 Utah 2d 156,
506 P. 2d 74, 76 (1973)

17-19

United States v. Williams. 109 F. Supp. 456,
460-62 (W. D. Ark. 1952)

19

West Virginia Oil & Gas Co. v. George E. Breece
Lumber Co. . 213 F. 2d 702 (5th Cir. 1954)

18-20

RULES
Rule 11(h), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Rule 60(b)(7)

29
17-19, 22, 23

OTHER AUTHORITIES
7 Moore' s Federal Practice §§ 60. 31, 60. 36
(2d ed. 1979)

17

11 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 2868 (1973)

17

Moore, "Federal Relief from Civil Judgments,"
55 Yale L. J. 623 (1946)

18

G. \WPL\O88\0OO00QO2.W51

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SHIRLEY GILLMOR, as Personal
Representative of the Estate
of Stephen T. Gillmor,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
DENNIS K. WRIGHT, SARA C.
WRIGHT, DAVID L. WRIGHT,
RONA R. WRIGHT,
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Cross-Appellants,
and
CHARLES F. GILLMOR,
EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR,
Intervenor-DefendantsRespondents/Cross-Appellants,
REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The trial court' s finding that the court in the

Partition Action intended to exclude Edward and Charles Gillmor
from access for grazing purposes to the major portion of their
land is clearly erroneous and against the weight of the evidence.
The question of easements was not an issue in the Partition
Action.

All of the parties in that action intended that

traditional access would be given to the respective parcels
awarded to the parties.

The trial court in the Partition Action

was not required to resolve disputed issues of fact regarding the
Sawmill Canyon Road.

The legal description for the road was

stipulated to by the parties and was based on erroneous

assumptions by Richard Huffman, who was hired as an expert
witness by Florence Gillmor and Charles Gillmor.

The weight of

the evidence was that the parties to the Partition Action
intended that full access would be given to the parties to the
property awarded to them in the Partition Action.

Because of the

mistaken description, Edward Gillmor is entitled to reform the
Partition Decree pursuant to his independent action in equity.
2.

Even if Edward Gillmor' s independent action in

equity fails, he has still established all of the elements for
the an easement by implication or by necessity.

Notions of

finality ought not to prevent access to his partitioned property
and his claim for an easement.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING EDWARD L.
GILLMOR 7 S CLAIM TO REFORM OR CORRECT THE
DESCRIPTION OF THE SAWMILL CANYON ROAD
I N THE PARTITION DECREE.
A.

The t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g t h a t t h e c o u r t i n
t h e P a r t i t i o n A c t i o n flifl n o t i n t e n f l t o fry/frrfl
h i m a n d C h a r l e s F. G i l l m o r a n e a s e m e n t o v e r
S h i r l e y Gillmor7 s land i s c l e a r l y erroneous.

In spite of the overwhelming evidence introduced at the
trial of the present case that the error in the description of
the Sawmill Canyon Road in the Partition Decree was the result of
a mutual mistake, the lower court found that "[t]he trial court
in the partition action did not intend to provide Edward Gillmor

-2G: \WPL\088\OOOOOQD2.W51

and Charles Gillmor access over parcels awarded to Florence
Gillmor. "

(Finding of Fact No. 28, R. 884. )

In his initial

brief in this appeal, Edward L. Gillmor attempted to marshal all
of the evidence in support of the trial court' s finding and to
demonstrate that the finding was clearly erroneous.

Because

Shirley Gillmor claimed in her brief, however, that he failed to
meet his burden,l Edward Gillmor summarizes the evidence for and
against the lower court7 s finding below:
1.

Th$ evidence in gyppprl; Qf the triftl
court7 s finding.

The only evidence regarding the court' s intent in the
Partition Action is found in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law entered in that case.

Yet the finding with respect to the

Sawmill Canyon Road was not a result of a finding of fact on
disputed evidence.

Rather, the description of the easement over

the Sawmill Canyon Road contained in the Findings of Fact in the
Partition Action was stipulated to by the parties.

It was first

submitted to the court by counsel for Charles F. Gillmor at the
hearing held on March 4, 1980, as Exhibit 113-D (marked Exhibit
D-46 in the present case), with the acknowledgement that it was
unsurveyed and that it could be modified by survey and further
order of the court.

1

Brief of Shirley Gillmor in Response to to Edward L.
Gillmor's brief (hereinafter "Shirley Gillmor brief"), at 15.
-3G:\WPL\088\00000QD2.W51

In her brief, Shirley Gillmor ignores this crucial
piece of evidence.

Judge Leary made no finding other than to

accept the stipulation of the parties.

He had no intent other

than that the parties' stipulation be incorporated into the
Partition Decree.

There is no evidence whatsoever that Judge

Leary actually intended to deny Edward and Charles Gillmor access
to the parcels awarded to them.
Shirley Gillmor notes in her brief,2 that at the
hearing of March 4, 1980, Judge Leary informed counsel for Edward
Gillmor that he would entertain a motion to strike Exhibit 113-D
if it did not appear to be in order.

Edward Gillmor failed to

discover the error in the description of the Sawmill Canyon Road
until 1987, although other errors were later discovered by the
parties and corrected. 3

It was a mistake that the legal

description for the Sawmill Canyon Road in Exhibit 113-D did not
give Edward or Charles traditional rights of access to the
parcels awarded to them and it was also a mistake that the error
in the metes and bounds description was not discovered sooner
than it was.

L

Edward Gillmor and Charles Gillmor both concede the

Shirley Gillmor brief, at 6.

3

The circumstances surrounding the discovery of the error
in the description were discussed in Edward Gillmor' s initial
brief, at 22-23.
-46 \WPL\088\00000QD2 W51

mistake in the present case.4

The issue here is not whether

there was a mistake, but whether Edward and Charles Gillmor are
entitled to an order in the present case correcting an obvious
error, neither intended by the parties to the Partition Action
nor by the court in that case.
To summarize, the only evidence of the trial court' s
intent in the Partition Action was its Findings of Fact, which
included a description of the Sawmill Canyon Road taken from
Exhibit 113-D.

Exhibit 113-D was introduced by the stipulation

of the parties during the trial of the Partition Action, and was
not the result of a resolution by the court of disputed facts.5

The mistake in the legal description originated with
Charles Gillmor' s counsel and with his expert witness, Richard
Huffman, in the Partition Action. (Tr. Vol. I, at 136. ) In spite
of the obvious fact that Charles Gillmor would not have intended a
mistake that excluded him from access to all but five acres of his
property (as he testified in the present case, Tr. Vol. I, at 63,
137-39), Shirley Gillmor insists that Judge Leary intended that
neither Edward nor Charles have traditional rights of access to the
parcels awarded to them in the Partition Action. The trial court
in the present case found that the Sawmill Canyon Road provides the
only traditional grazing access to the eastern portions of their
property.
(Finding of Fact No. 25, R. 884. ) Judge Leary did not
intend to deny that access.
All he intended was to adopt the
description of the rights-of-way in Exhibit 113-D.
5

As argued below, the description of the Sawmill Canyon
Road found at page 60 of the Findings of Fact in the Partition
Action was inconsistent with the description of the same right-ofway found at page 21 of the same Findings of Fact, thus undermining
Shirley Gillmor' s argument that the court in the Partition Action
somehow intended to deny Edward and Charles Gillmor access to the
major portion of the property awarded to them.
-5G \WPL\088\00000QD2 W51

2.

The evidence against the trial court' s
finding.

In her brief, Shirley Gillmor ignores the fact that
rights of access were never in dispute in the Partition Action.
All parties agreed that they would have full rights of access to
whichever parcels were awarded to them.

There was no need for

the trial court in the Partition Action to make specific findings
or to resolves disputes in the evidence regarding easements. 6
All of the parties to the Partition Action assumed that,
whichever theory of partition was followed by the court, they
would be given full access to the property awarded to them.
In her brief, Shirley Gillmor claims that Edward
Gillmor argued at the trial of the Partition Action and in his
two appeals that the partition theory espoused by Florence and
Charles was unfair "because it precludes traditional access to
his property and traditional use of his property for grazing
livestock."7

This assertion is untrue and is unsupported by any

evidence in either the Partition Action or in the record of the
present case.

In the Partition Action it was always contemplated

that, regardless of how the Gillmor Ranch was partitioned, the

As Edward Gillmor argued in his initial brief on appeal
in the present case, access and rights-of-way were never in dispute
in the Partition Action.
The only dispute was the theory of
partition to be used. See Edward Gillmor' s brief, at 13 n. 6, 25.
7

Shirley Gillmor brief, at 18.
-6-
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parties would have traditional access to the properties awarded
to them. 8
Whether or not the property awarded could be put to its
11

traditional use" depended on the specific property received,

taking into account the entire 34,000 acre ranch as a whole.
Some parcels partitioned were no longer suitable for the
"traditional use" of livestock grazing, while other parcels were
still livestock grazing land.

All of the parties to the

Partition Action were not in the livestock business.

In the

Partition Action, Edward Gillmor' s position was that each parcel
should not be divided into four equal parcels because the smaller
separate parcels in some cases would be difficult, if not
impossible, to use.

Instead, he argued that it would be better

to award a whole parcel to each party based on the utility of the
specific parcel.

For example, parcels in urban areas should,

when possible, be awarded to those not in the livestock business
while parcels suitable for grazing should, where possible, be
awarded to those parties in that business.

8

The parties and the

In the Partition Action, Edward Gillmor did not object to
the opposing theory of partition because it would deny him access,
but because it would make it difficult for him to conduct a
traditional ranching enterprise if each parcel were partitioned
into smaller equal pieces, rather than dividing up the parcels
between the parties based upon the utility of each parcel.
See
Gillmor v. Gillmor, 637 P. 2d at 737 (quoted in Edward Gillmor' s
initial brief in the present case, at 13 n. 6).

-7G \WPL\088\00000QD2 W51

court in the Partition Action agreed that access for traditional
uses would be given to the parcels partitioned.

With respect to

the Sawmill property, the court in the Partition Action
specifically found that the present use of that property was
"grazing," and that the highest and best use of the property was
"[g]razing and recreational."9

Edward and Charles Gillmor

should have received traditional access to each parcel awarded to
them including the Sawmill property, the highest and best use for
which is grazing, even after the partition.

Because of the error

in the description of the easement, this access was denied.

The

lower court in the present case specifically found that without
use of the road, neither Edward nor Charles Gillmor have
traditional grazing access to the parcels awarded to them under
the Partition Decree. 10
Shirley Gillmor also cites the so-called Trespass Case
between the parties, as evidence that Edward Gillmor "has
consistently refused to accept the fact that he cannot continue
to operate as he has in the past."
n. 9)

(Shirley Gillmor brief, at 19

Her reading of that case, however, is mistaken.

It had

nothing to do with any refusal by Edward Gillmor to accept the
results of the Partition Action.

Rather, that case focused on

y

33,

Finding of Fact No. 31 in the Partition Action.
at 21 in the present case. )
10

Finding of Fact No. 25, R. 884.
-8-
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(Exhibit

difficulties created because of migration of cattle from one
unfenced parcel to another on parcels in Salt Lake County.
(Testimony of Edward L. Gillmor, Jr. , Tr. Vol. I, at 48-50. )
After his initial decision in the Trespass Case relating to
activities occurring in 1981, Judge Dennis Frederick, of the
Third Judicial District Court, dismissed later trespass claims
and counterclaims between the parties arising out of ranching
activities in 1984.

Noting that

,f

[t]he boundaries of the

separate parcels are, for the most part, unfenced,"11

Judge

Frederick found:
There have been numerous incidents in the
year 1984 of Stephen T. Gillmor' s sheep
grazing on land owned by Edward Leslie
Gillmor, and numerous incidents in the year
1984 of Edward Leslie Gillmor's cattle and
sheep grazing on parcels of land owned by
Florence Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor and
leased from them by Stephen T. Gillmor, but
the proof has not been clear and convincing
that each party had the ability to comply
strictly with the Judgment and Permanent
Injunction and that each party had willfully
and knowingly violated such Judgment and
Permanent Injunction.

11

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Gillmor v.
Gillmor, Third Judicial District Court, Civil Nos. C81-3875 and
C82-3490), the so-called "Trespass Case."
The Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law were submitted to the trial court in the
present case by way of a post-trial submission.
They have been
designated as part of the supplemental record in this case pursuant
to Rule 11(h), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. A copy of the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the Trespass Case are
attached hereto as Exhibit B.
-96. \WPL\088\00000QD2.W51

(Finding of Fact No. 5 from the Trespass Case.)

The dispute

between the parties caused by the lack of fencing has nothing to
do with Edward Gillmor' s inability to have access to the Sawmill
property because of the mistake in the Partition Decree and has
no bearing on the present case.

The issue in the present case is

simply whether Edward Gillmor can use to Sawmill Canyon Road to
transport livestock to his portion of the Sawmill property, which
is now fenced.
As indicated above, the parties to the Partition Action
intended that full access would be given to each party to the
parcels awarded to that party.
case.

Access was not an issue in that

During the first trial of the Partition Action, Florence

Gillmor (Shirley7 s predecessor) and Charles Gillmor jointly filed
a "Petition Relating to Procedure to be Followed in Partitioning
Land," in 1976 in which they requested the court to divide each
parcel at issue into four equal parcels with "cross easements to
be awarded all parties to provide traditional means of access to
each tract."

(Exhibit D-50, at 1; emphasis added.)

This intent was demonstrated further by the evidence
that during the Partition Action, the parties and their counsel
travelled over the Sawmill Canyon Road to the top of the plateau
for the purpose of inspecting the property and the available
access.

(Tr. Vol. I, at 49-50, 76, 129-30.)

At the trial of the

present case both Edward L. Gillmor, Jr. , and Charles F. Gillmor

-10G \WPL\088\00000QD2 W51

(who were adversaries in the Partition Action) testified that
there was a mutual agreement between the parties during the trip
that, regardless of how the Sawmill property was partitioned,
access would be available by the Sawmill Canyon Road.

(Tr. Vol.

I, at 59-60, 130-32, 143-45, 148, 162. )
The intent of the parties to provide a right-of-way
over the Sawmill Canyon Road was further demonstrated by the only
testimony given at the trial of the Partition Action relating to
the terrain of the Sawmill property.

At the first trial, Stephen

T. Gillmor (Shirley Gillmor' s deceased husband and her
predecessor in interest) testified that all parties would have to
have access to the partitioned parcels of the Sawmill property by
way of the Sawmill Canyon Road:
Q
[By Mr Lee] With respect to the
various parcels, if a division were to be
made by this Court, would it be necessary to
have access up the road you' ve referred to
across the various parcels? Would that
access have to be available to all parties?
A.
Definitely so. The topography is
so steep and rugged in the rear portion of
this it is the only vehicle access into the
area.
So very definitely, this access would be
-- have to be left open for all parties to
make use of the parcel.
(Transcript of First Trial in the Partition Action, at 335). 12

u

This passage was quoted in Edward L. Gillmor' s initial
brief, at 17. The trial court in the present case took judicial
(continued. . . )
-11G \WPL\088\00000QD2 W51

Stephen Gillmor' s testimony shows not only that the
Sawmill Canyon Road provides the only reasonable access to the
Sawmill property, but it also shows that he was agreeable
(speaking for Florence Gillmor) that the road be available for
use by all parties to the Partition Action, regardless of who was
awarded which parcel.
As noted above, the error in the description of the
right-of-way contained in the Partition Decree was created by
Richard Huffman, an expert hired by Charles Gillmor.

He assumed

that the parties would have access to their properties across the
Wright' s property and up Thirtyfive Canyon.
Gillmor7 s initial brief on appeal, at 19-22.

See Edward L.
Huffman' s

assumptions were erroneous, which resulted in the mistaken
description in the Findings of Fact and in the Partition
Decree. 13

He testified in the present case that his goal was to

(. . . continued)
notice of the entire court file in the Partition Action, including
the transcript from which the passage quoted above was taken. The
parties in the present case have stipulated that those portions of
the transcript reviewed by the lower court in the present case
should be added to the record on appeal and that a supplemental
record should be prepared by the clerk of the district court. A
copy of the portion of the transcript quoted above is attached
hereto as Exhibit A.
13

Huffman' s assumptions about access were even more
erroneous with regard to Edward Gillmor' s property. Even assuming
that access were available from the highway, over the Wright
property, and up Thirtyfive Canyon, Edward Gillmor was given no
easement across Charles Gillmor' s property to his own.
(See the
map attached to Edward Gillmor' s initial brief as Exhibit A. )
(continued. . . )
-12G \WPL\088\00000QD2 W51

divide the Sawmill property into four parcels that were equal in
terms of "quality and quantity,"14 that could be of equal
"usability" for gazing purposes, which he believed was the
highest and best use of the property.15
Huffman never testified in the Partition Action on the
issue of access and his recommendations regarding easements were
never at issue.

The trial court in that case was not required to

choose to believe his testimony over other witnesses.

The only

mention during the partition trial of Huffman' s easement
descriptions occurred on March 4, 1980, where counsel for Charles
Gillmor informed Judge Leary:
And the proposed stipulation is that if Mr.
Huffman were called to testify, that he would
testify that he prepared those descriptions
using existing roads wherever possible; that
they are the best descriptions he can make
without an on-the-ground survey; and we would
submit that they could be modified by survey

13

(. . . continued)
Thus, even under Huffman' s assumptions, Edward Gillmor would have
no access to his property from the south.
14

Tr. Vol. I, at 206-07.

15

Vol.

Tr. Vol. I, at 207.
I, at 215.

See also Huffman' s testimony at Tr.
-13-
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and by further order of the court should thev
prove unreasonable.
(Exhibit D-47; emphasis added. ) 1 6
In her brief, Shirley Gillmor ignores the fact that
Huffman was hired by Charles Gillmor as well as by Florence
Gillmor.

As he testified at the trial of the present case, 17

Charles Gillmor did not intend that he should have no access to
the eastern portion of his property. 18

It makes no sense to

believe that Judge Leary truly intended to exclude Charles and
Edward Gillmor from access to the major portions of their
property for grazing purposes, particularly since those eastern
portions were the most desirable for grazing cattle, which was
the occupation of both Charles and Edward Gillmor. 19

16

Shirley Gillmor quoted this passage in her brief in the
present case, without commenting on the clear implications of Mr.
Clegg' s statement.
He was not offering it as a perfect and
complete description of all easements that would be necessary to
give traditional rights of access over the approximately 34,000
acres being partitioned.
Rather, he recognized that it might
contain errors, and stipulated that corrections could thereafter be
made to correct such errors, should the descriptions prove
unreasonable.
17

Tr. Vol. I, at 63, 136-39.

18

In the present case, the trial court found that neither
Charles nor Edward Gillmor have traditional grazing access to the
eastern portions of their Sawmill property unless they are allowed
access over the property awarded to Florence Gillmor. (Finding of
Fact No. 25, R. 884. )
19

This argument is supported by Huffman' s own testimony in
the present case that his goal devising a plan for the partitioning
of the Sawmill property was to create four separate parcels of
(continued. . . )
-14G \WPL\088\00000QD2 W51

The court' s finding in the present case that Judge
Leary intended to exclude Charles and Edward Gillmor from having
traditional access along the Sawmill Canyon Road is further
eroded by the contradictions between the two descriptions of the
right-of-way in the Findings of Fact in the Partition Action.

In

her brief, Shirley seems to concede that the Findings of Fact
contains contradictory descriptions of the right-of-way on the
Sawmill property.

(Shirley Gillmor brief, at 8 n. 5. )

As Edward

Gillmor pointed out in his initial brief in this case, at 18-19,
the description on page 21 of the Findings of Fact in the
Partition Action is different from the description contained on
Exhibit 113-D (which was used at page 60 of the Findings of
Fact).

The description at page 21 defines the entirety of the

Sawmill Canyon Road, as it has traditionally been used.
Vol.

I, at 65-69. )

(Tr.

The description at page 21 is inconsistent

with the description of the right-of-way at page 60, which was
used in the Partition Decree.

This contradiction between

descriptions within the Findings of Fact in the Partition Action
demonstrates the mistake in the description ultimately used in
the Partition Decree. 20

iy

(. . . continued)
equal value and usability for grazing purposes.
206-07, 215. )
20

(Tr. Vol. I, at

In her brief, Shirley Gillmor questions whether Edward
Gillmor was aware that the description on page 60 of the Findings
(continued...)
-15G: \WPL\088\00000QD2. W51

The trial court' s finding that the court in the
Partition Action intended to deny Edward and Charles Gillmor from
traditional access for grazing to their property is against the
clear weight of the evidence and should be reversed.
B.

Shirley Gillmor misconstrues this Court7 s
decision in St. Pierre v. Edmonds.
In her brief, Shirley Gillmor cited St. Pierre v.

Edmonds, 645 P. 2d 615 (Utah 1987), for the proposition that "an
independent action is allowed only to remedy an error caused by
an affirmative act that is so insidious as to possibly undermine
the very integrity of the judicial system itself.11
Gillmor brief, at 17; emphasis added. )
thing.

(Shirley

St. Pierre held no such

That case involved allegations of fraud upon the court

based on claims that the plaintiff had assented to a settlement
agreement as a result of harassment, threats, abuse, and
intimidation by her ex-husband.

The case does not state that in

independent action will only lie for such claims or that such an
action is no longer viable to remedy errors based on mutual
mistakes of fact in legal descriptions.

(. . . continued)
of Fact in the Partition Action was the same as the description in
Exhibit 113-D.
(Shirley Gillmor brief, at 8, n. 5. )
Edward
Gillmor, however, did not overlook that fact in his initial brief.
(Edward Gillmor brief, at 18-19 & n. 11. ) The point that Edward
Gillmor sought to make is that the description of the right-of-way
on page 21 of the Findings of Fact is different from the
description on page 60, which was taken from Exhibit 113-D. This,
again, points up the mistake in the description ultimately used in
the Partition Decree.
-16G \WPL\088\00000QD2 W51

Contrary to Shirley Gillmor's assertions,21 St. Pierre
did not overrule Eaan v. Eaan, 560 P. 2d 704, 705-06 (Utah 1977),
Stewart v. Sullivan, 29 Utah 2d 156, 506 P. 2d 74, 76 (1973), or
Nev v. Harrison. 5 Utah 2d 217, 299 P. 2d 1114, 1116 (1956), each
of which was cited by Edward Gillmor in his initial brief22 for
the rule that mutual mistakes or erroneous assumptions may
justify setting aside a decree under an independent action in
equity or under Rule 60(b)(7).

In St. Pierre this Court

implicitly recognized the validity of that rule by the
authorities it cited in its opinion.
St.

For example, the Court in

Pierre cited 11 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure § 2868 (1973).

645 P.2d at 618.

As Edward Gillmor

noted in his initial brief, that treatise specifically provides
that an independent action in equity "also will lie on the basis
of accident or of mistake. "

Id. § 2868, at 239-40.

The St.

Pierre opinion further cited 7 Moore' s Federal Practice §§ 60. 31,
60.36 (2d ed. 1979).

645 P. 2d at 618.

In that treatise,

Professor Moore stated:
Relief from a judgment by an independent
action on the basis of accident or mistake is
less common than relief on the basis of
fraud, but, nevertheless, both accident and
mistake afford the basis for relief in an
appropriate situation . . . .

dl

Shirley Gillmor7 s brief, at 17 n. 8.

22

See Edward Gillmor's brief, at 37-38.
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7 Moore' s Federal Practice 11 60. 37[1], at 60-381 (2d ed. 1990)
(footnotes omitted).23
Finally, the Court in St. Pierre also cited Moore,
"Federal Relief from Civil Judgments," 55 Yale L. J. 623 (1946).
645 P. 2d at 618.

That article was relied on by the court in West

Virginia Oil & Gas Co. v. George E. Breece Lumber Co. . 213 F. 2d
702 (5th Cir. 1954), for the principle that a federal court, in
an independent action in equity, has jurisdiction to modify a
final judgment in a former proceeding on the ground of mistake as
well as fraud.

213 F. 2d at 706.

Shirley Gillmor has plainly misread St. Pierre, which
supports Edward Gillmor' s independent action for mistake by the
authorities on which it relies.

The validity of the rule of

Egan, Stewart, and Ney relating to independent actions and Rule
60(b)(7) motions is consistent with St. Pierre and with the other
courts who have allowed such mechanisms to remedy errors caused
by mistakes or erroneous assumptions.

Having failed to read all

of the authorities cited in St. Pierre, Shirley Gillmor argues
that this Court should ignore the non-Utah authorities "because
their influence is minimal" in light of the Court' s St. Pierre
decision.24

These other authorities,25 however, should not be

"
In support, Professor Moore cites the case of West
Virginia Oil & Gas Co. v. George E. Breece Lumber Co. , 213 F. 2d 702
(5th Cir. 1954), quoted by Edward Gillmor in his initial brief.
24

Shirley Gillmor brief, at 17 n. 8.
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disregarded simply because the St. Pierre case did not involve a
mutual mistake of fact relating to a legal description.

Rather,

they give additional validity to the Eaan, Stewart, and Ney
opinions.

St. Pierre should not be read as limiting independent

actions solely to those involving fraud.
Shirley Gillmor contends in her brief, 26 that West
Virginia Oil & Gas Company v. George E. Breece Lumber, 213 F.2d
702 (5th Cir. 1954), is inapplicable because it held that a
judgment will only be reformed only where the party seeking
reformation was without fault or neglect.

Id,, at 704, 706.

She

misconstrues that rule of that case as it applies to the present
action.

The parties in West Virginia Oil & Gas, sought to modify

a mistaken legal description in a judgment in a prior action that
had been entered pursuant to a settlement agreement between the
parties.

West Virginia Oil & Gas could have discovered the error

had it double-checked the description or had the property
surveyed.

As it was, the court stated that "the necessity of

finality, " id., at 704, would not prevent the reformation of the

(. . . continued)
The authorites relied on by Edward Gillmor included the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in State of Wisconsin
v. State of Michigan, 295 U.S. 455, 55 S. Ct. 786, 79 L.Ed. 1541
(1935), which allowed an independent action for the purpose of
reforming a mutual mistake in a decree relating to a boundary line
between two states.
See also United States v, Williams, 109 F.
Supp. 456, 460-62 (W. D. Ark. 1952) (under Rule 60(b), court set
aside a decree quieting title to real property 22 years later based
on petitioner's mistaken reliance on her lawyer).
25

26

Shirley Gillmor brief, at 17 n. 8.
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mistake in the prior judgment.

This holding was in spite of West

Virginia Gas & Oil' s neglect in not catching the error in the
earlier proceeding.
Similarly, Edward Gillmor' s failure to catch the error
in the description of the Sawmill Canyon Road when the Partition
Decree was first entered should not bar his claims in this case.
Although he failed to notice the error in the legal description
for the Sawmill Canyon Road when it was presented to the trial
court in the Partition Action in Exhibit 113-D, that failure
should not preclude his claim for reformation.

The error in the

exhibit was not created by him, but by Richard Huffman who was
hired by Charles Gillmor.
Moreover, the issue of access over the Sawmill Canyon
Road should not be viewed in a vacuum.

Questions of rights-of-

way and access were not at issue in the Partition Action.

The

entire case lasted over a period of years and involved complex
issues under the Utah partition statute that were hotly contested
between the parties, the most significant of which was which
theory of partition should be used.

Edward Gillmor' s failure to

double-check the description of the Sawmill Canyon Road on
Exhibit 113-D in the middle of this complex and difficult case
and his reliance on the representations of the other parties that
he would be given full access to the parcels awarded to him does

-20G: \WPL\088\00000QD2.W51

not rise to the level of the kind of negligence or fault
necessary to cause his claim to fail.
Obviously, any mistaken legal description that might
find its way into a deed or decree could be caught if the parties
were more prudent.

Mistakes in legal descriptions are caused

precisely because a party has overlooked the error or has failed
to check it properly or to have the property surveyed.

This kind

of neglect has not prevented courts in the past from reforming
legal descriptions to reflect the intent of the parties, and it
should not do so in this case.

Given the length and complexity

of the Partition Action and the diminutive nature of the error in
the metes and bounds description of the road in the Partition
Decree, this Court should not hold against Edward Gillmor simply
because he failed to catch the error immediately, any more than
it should hold against Charles Gillmor because the error was
caused by his own expert, Richard Huffman, and was overlooked by
his own lawyer in the Partition Action.
C.

Edward L. Gillmor/ s independent action in
equity is not barred bv laches.
In her brief, Shirley Gillmor asserts that Edward L.

Gillmor is barred because he did not assert his claims within a
reasonable time after the Partition Decree was entered.27

She

In a footnote in her brief, Shirley Gillmor suggests that
Edward Gillmor' s independent action in equity is somehow timebarred by the statute of limitations that applies to reformation of
(continued. . . )
-21G: \WPL\088\00000QD2.W51

acknowledges this Court' s holding in St. Pierre v. Edmonds that
an independent action in equity is controlled, not by statutes of
limitation, but by "the doctrine of laches and other equitable
principles."28

645 P. 2d 615, 618 (Utah 1987).

Shirley did not

raise the defense of laches in the lower court and cannot do so
on appeal for the first time.

Lane v. Messer, 731 P. 2d 488, 491

(Utah 1986).
Moreover, in order to establish a defense based on
laches, Shirley would have to demonstrate that Edward Gillmor
unjustifiably delayed bringing his claims and that she has been
prejudiced by the delay.

Papinikolas Brothers Enterprises v.

Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates, 535 P. 2d 1256, 1260 (Utah
1975) (in order to establish laches, one must show (1) lack of
diligence; and (2) an injury to defendant owing to such lack of
diligence).
trial.

Shirley Gillmor introduced no such evidence at

Her only allegation of prejudice is that her property

27

(. . . continued)
deeds.
(Shirley Gillmor brief, at 13 n. 7. ) That agrument must
fail.
Shirley Gillmore failed to raise that defense before the
trial court and cannot raise it for the first time on appeal.
Moreover, Edward Gillmor has not sued to reform a deed or
instrument of conveyance, but to set aside or reform the Partition
Decree pursuant to an independent action in equity, authorized
under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. As Edward Gillmor
argued in his earlier brief, there is no statute of limitations
regarding such actions. See authorites cited in Edward Gillmor' s
intitial brief, at 41 & n. 20. See also St. Pierre v. Edmonds, 645
P. 2d at 618.
28

Shirley Gillmor brief, at 22.
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will be burdened by the additional use of the road.

That is not

the kind of prejudice, however, that must be shown in order to
establish the defense of laches.
result of the delay.

The prejudice must arise as a

Shirley Gillmor did not show any such

prejudice at trial and, accordingly, cannot claim that Edward
Gillmor7 s claims are barred by laches.
In her brief, Shirley Gillmor cited Laub v. South
Central Utah Telephone Assoc. , Inc. , 657 P. 2d 1304, 1306 (Utah
1982), a case decided under Rule 60(b)(7), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.29

Rule 60(b)(7), however, does not apply to the

present case, which is an independent action in equity brought by
Edward Gillmor.

Although Rule 60(b) provides that a motion under

Rule 60(b)(5), (6), and (7) must be brought "within a reasonable
time" the rule does not state when an independent action must be
brought.

As the St. Pierre case held, the filing of such an

action is governed only by "the doctrine of laches and other
equitable principles. "

645 P. 2d at 618.

This is not a case where Edward Gillmor sat on his
hands and knowingly failed to pursue the correction of the error
after the Partition Decree was entered.

His son testified at the

trial of the present action that after the entry of the Decree,
4
his father made no use of the Sawmill property until 1983
pursuant to a stipulation with Stephen T. Gillmor.

^

Shirley Gillmor brief, at 23-24.
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(Tr. Vol. I,

at 41. )

After 1983, he used his portion of the Sawmill property

to graze horses and cattle, gaining access to the property by
using the Sawmill Canyon Road, as he had traditionally done.
believed that he had a right to use the road.

There was no other

access to the range on the eastern portion of his property.
Vol.

I, at 41-42, 65, 122-23.)

He

(Tr.

As soon as he learned of the

error in the description he sought the assistance of legal
counsel.

(Tr. Vol. I, at 65. )
Edward Gillmor has not waited an unreasonable time

before bringing his action.

The lapse of time between the

conclusion of the Partition Action and the commencement of the
present case did not cause any prejudice to Shirley Gillmor so as
to sustain a laches defense.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT EDWARD
L. GILLMOR WAS NOT ENTITLED TO AN EASEMENT BY
IMPLICATION OR BY NECESSITY ACROSS SHIRLEY
GILLMOR' S PROPERTY.
Shirley Gillmor completely fails to explain or
distinguish the legal authorities cited by Edward Gillmor in his
brief showing his entitlement to an easement by implication or by
necessity.

She asserts that these doctrines have no meaning in

the present case under "traditional notions of finality inherent
in the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel."30

30

Shirley Gillmor brief, at 25-26 (quoting from Finding of
Fact No. 32, R. 885. )
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She fails to explain, however, why an easement should not be
implied in the present case where the division of property was
made by judicial decree.

Nor does she inform the Court exactly

how a partition of property by judicial decree is any different
from a division of property by a conveyance from a common
grantor.

In his initial brief Edward L. Gillmor cited

authorities that hold that an easement may be implied where a
partition decree issued by a court has left one of the parties
land-locked. 31

Shirley Gillmor failed to address these

authorities in any way or to show why they do not apply.
Shirley Gillmor attempts to set up a parade of
horribles, suggesting that the Partition Decree was etched in
stone, never to be disturbed, not even to correct an obvious
error.32

She ignores, again, the fact that her predecessor,

61

Edward L. Gillmor brief, at 28-29.

32

She stated in her brief:
The final judgment in the partition case is a
complex, finely tuned balance of property
rights.
No party was completely satisfied
with the court' s decision, but to selectively
return and tinker with the court' s allocation
couldmean the start of a review of every
single piece of property divided by the court,
some of which have now been given away, sold,
leased, and even lost to eminent domain.

(Shirley Gillmor brief, at 26. ) Although there was no evidence
presented at the trial of the present action that Shirley Gillmor,
Stephen Gillmor, or Florence Gillmor were anything but "completely
satisfied with the court's decision," there was evidence that they
(continued...)
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Florence Gillmor, proposed to the court in the Partition Action
that the court "view the easements as items of continuing
jurisdiction."

(Exhibit D-51.)

She overlooks the fact that,

when Charles Gillmor' s counsel introduced Exhibit 113-D in the
Partition Action, he told the court that the descriptions of the
easements contained therein "could be modified by survey and by
further order of the court should they prove unreasonable. "
(Exhibit D-47. )

Shirley Gillmor also neglects to inform this

Court that Florence Gillmor, her predecessor, also discovered
errors in the Partition Decree after it was entered.

(Testimony

of Richard Huffman, Tr. Vol. I, at 200-06); Exhibits D-57, D-58. )
She fails to explain to this Court how it is that errors
(including the error in describing the Sawmill Canyon Road) could
have infected a decree that was such a "finely tuned balance of
property rights."33
In this light, the Partition Decree does not appear so
impregnable.

It was undoubtedly complex and represented an

enormous amount of work both by the court and the parties.

It

was never intended, however, that errors could not be corrected

(. . . continued)
too sought to modify the Decree based on errors in legal
descriptions. Richard Huffman admitted that the Partition Decree
contained "typographical and clerical errors,"
(Tr. Vol. I, at
200-06), as reflected in his two affidavits filed after the entry
of the Partition Decree.
(Exhibits D-57, D-58 in the present
case. )
33

Shirley Gillmor brief, at 26.
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in order to give the parties access to the property awarded to
them.

In spite of Shirley Gillmor' s professed fears, Edward

Gillmor does not intend to "selectively return and tinker" with
the Decree.34

Nor does he seek to "review every single piece of

property divided by the court."35

He has no desire to re-

examine properties that have been "given away, sold, leased, and
even lost to eminent domain."36

All he seeks is the right to

use the road that he used prior to the Partition Action and which
he used thereafter until 1987. 37

Without that right, his

Sawmill property is virtually useless to him, a result clearly
not intended by the court in the Partition Action, which
specifically found in its Findings of Fact that the Sawmill
property could be partitioned "without great prejudice" to the
owners.

(Exhibit 33, at 21. )

Contrary to that specific intent

of the court in the Partition Action, Edward Gillmor will suffer
the greatest prejudice -- the loss of the use of most of the
Sawmill property for grazing -- if this Court does not reverse
the order of dismissal in the present case. 38

s

Shirley Gillmor brief, at 26.

36

id.

37

Tr. Vol. I, at 41-42, 65, 111-12, 122-23, 139.

*

38

entire

If Shirley Gillmor is so concerned about reopening the
Partition Decree, she should have no objection to the
(continued. . . )
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CONCLUSION
Edward L. Gillmor has established a right to an
easement by implication or by necessity.

The doctrines of res

judicata and collateral estoppel cannot be used to prevent his
claims for an easement, all of the elements of which he has
established.

Even if this Court decides that his claims to

reform or modify the Partition Decree should be denied, the Court
should still grant him the easement across the Sawmill Canyon
Road, where it crosses Shirley Gillmor' s property, in order to
give him access for grazing purposes to his own property.

His

claims for an easement are not linked to his claim for
reformation of the Decree pursuant to his independent action in
equity, but are separate and distinct.
As an additional and alternative ground, under the
independent action in equity Edward Gillmor is entitled to an
order reforming or modifying the Partition Decree so as to
correct the error in the description of the Sawmill Canyon Road,
plainly not intended by the parties.

d8

(. . . continued)
Couart' s merely holding that Edward L. Gillmor has an easement over
the Sawmill Canyon Road by implication or by necessity. A finding
that the elements of those doctrines have been met will not mean
that the entire Decree would be re-examined.
Edward Gillmor7 s
claims for an easement by implication or by necessity are entirely
separate and distinct from those for reformation of the Partition
Decree under an independent action in equity. A holding by this
Court that he has no right to reform the Decree does not mean that
his claims for an easement by implication or necessity must also
fail.
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ADDENDUM
The following documents are attached hereto: 39
1.

Copy of the transcript of the testimony of Stephen

T. Gillmor from the first trial of the Partition Action, of which
the trial court in the present case took judicial notice. 40
(Transcript of First Trial in the Partition Action, at 327-40.)
2.

Copy of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law in the "Trespass Case."
DATED this

Z5

day of January, 1991.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

R. Stephen Marshall
Attorneys for intervenor defendant
and cross-appellant Edward L.
Gillmor
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone:
(801) 532-3333

39

As indicated above, the following documents were included
in the Supplemental Record designated by the parties in the present
case, pursuant to Rule 11(h), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
40

Tr. Vol. I, at 11-13.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct
copies of the within and foregoing Reply Brief of Cross Appellant/Intervenor-Defendant Edward Leslie Gillmor to be hand
delivered this

^-J

day of January, 1991, to the following:

James B. Lee
John B. Wilson
Parsons, Behle & Latimer
185 South State Street
Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
D. Gilbert Athay
72 East 400 South
Suite 325
Salt Lake City, Utah
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

2

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

1
4

FIL V,1 FJ:

EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR and
SIV GILLMOR, his wife,

REPORTER'S RESIDUE
APPEAL TRANSCRIPTION OF
TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

6
Plaintiffs,
6
7
8

FLORENCE GILLMOR, CHARLES
GILLMOR and MELBA GILLMOR,

Civil No. 223998
RLEO IN CLB»rr O r U g
S«te U U Caufrty, U;«k"

Defendants,

9

FEB 1 5 1978

10

W . Sttft;«fl £r«n, Otfk %H Om

11
12

commencing at the hour of 10:00 a.m., the above-entitled

13

proceedings continued in trial in Courtroom Mo. One of

14

the Metropolitan Hall of Justice, Salt Lake City, Utah;

15

said cause being heard by the Honorable Peter F. Leary,

1C

Judge in the Third Judicial District, State of Utah.
APPEARANCES

17

Mr. E. J. Skeen, Attorney-at-Law, Skeen and Skeen,

18
19

536 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, Tele-

20

phone 363-8037; and Mr. Rex J. Hanson, Hanson, VJadsworth &

21

Russon, Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, Tele-

22

phone 359-7611, appearing on behalf of the Plaintiffs.

23

Mr. James B. Lee, Attorney-at-Law, Parsons, Behle &

24

Latimer, 79 South State Street P.O. Box 11898, Salt Lake

25

City, Utah 34147, Telephone 532-1234, appearing on behalf

26

of Defendant Florence Gillmor.
Mr. H. James Clear, Attorney-at-Law, Snow, Christensen &|

27
28

Martineau, Continental Bank BuiiW&n<a, S a l t B t k e W i t y ,

29
•
30
JO

8AA., Telephone 521-9000, appeJrin^oit-beh^Tlf
of Defendants
>eJring\)ir^ehVlf or
Defendant

F I L

C«rt

BE IT REMEMBERED, that on the 10th day ipf Mav. 1.977,

Charles F. Gillmor and Melba G. Gilfcnori; 1^78
:
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1

on that large mountain.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. LEE:

4
5

Thank y o u .
We're ready to proceed to the Sawmill,

your Honor.
THE COURT:

Go ahead.

6

SAWMILL PROPERTY

M

MR. LEE:

We'll call to the stand Steve Gillmor.

8

(Whereupon, STEPHEN T. GILLMOR, JR., called as a w i t -

9

ness by counsel for Defendant Florence Gillmor, and having

10

previously been sworn to tell the truth, resumed the w i t -

11

ness stand and testified upon his oath as follows:)

12

DIRECT EXAMINATION

13

BY MR. LEE:

14\

Q.

Excuse me a moment, your Honor.

I'm looking

15

for the overlay that we had marked yesterday with respect

KM

to this property.

17

what is described in this lawsuit as the Sawmill Property?

Mr. Gillmor, are you acquainted with

18

A.

I am; yes.

19

Q,

Please tell us where it's located?

20

A.

It's located up the Weber River above the Echo

21

Junction, which one goes to Evanston and one toward

22

Coalville; located above that junction to the east.

23

T O orient the Court, and prior to the large rise in

24

elevation where you start up onto Wasatch, that's the

25

general location of it.

2G\
2

?

2S\

And it's located to the north and to the west of the
property in Sixth East as being Fifth East.
Q.

Referring specifically to Plaintiffs' Exhibit

291

8P, is the Sawmill Property that shown in a green shaded

•to

area on the exhibit?
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7

1
2

A.
ft

Yes, i t

is.

Also referring to the Exhibit 8P, does the Inter-

21

state Highway which goes from Echo to Evanston, Wyoming

4

up here on the Exhibit?

•

A.

Yes, it corners on the lower southeast corner

•

of the area marked in green, and the section corner is

M

right on the roadway.

•
•

Q.

It's right on the freeway.

If I might indicate to the Court, on Exhibit 8P

where the Interstate Highway comes off of the edge of the

10

map, it indicates 3.6 miles to Echo Junction.

And on the

11

east end of Exhibit 8P it indicates Evanston, Wyoming as

12

being 22 miles away.

13

Gillmor?

Would you come over to the map, Mr.

Mj

(Whereupon,the witness left the witness stand.)

15

Q.

16
1? I

And would you describe for the Court the type

of property which we have in Sawmill?
A.

It's a d i f f e r e n t — l i t t l e different type of graz-

18

ing land than the most p a r t — t h a n

19 j

are many areas indicated by this green color on the map

20

u n d e r n e a t h — o r , on this map, that does have some timber

21

areas and some portions as does Sixth East.

22
231
24

But for the most part it's a more arid,

There

sage-type

area; more of a browse area than it is in Sixth East.
Generally speaking it's lesser quality grazing land

251

than is Sixth East.

26

area than the other grazing

27 1

this Sixth East.

It's a much rougher, steeper grade
land.

And the Sawmill Canyon itself is a sandstone forma-

28

tion, red in color, much like we know in the parks in Zions,

291

et cetera, with sheer cliff areas.

M

As you start in on the south boundary of the property,
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1

i t ' s v e r y s c e n i c in the lower e n d .

2

a m i l e f u r t h e r to t h e north it o p e n s u p i n t o a b a s i n

3

of sage and browse, mainly, with some Aspen hollows

4

feed

*

Then as you approach

It h a s v e r y d i s t i n c t ridge a n d v a l l e y

situations.

T h a t d o e s n ' t e x i s t in the other a r e a w h i c h is m o r e

7

hills.

9
10

that

i n t o it w i t h f o r b s , a l s o .

6 1

*

area

rolling

So, it's of a distinctly different type of grazing
situation.
0-

W o u l d y o u take the red p e n and i n d i c a t e w h a t

11

a c c e s s is a v a i l a b l e

to the S a w m i l l P r o p e r t y w i t h an X on

12

—where

13

A.

14

crosses

15

from the Interstate.

16

T h e old h i g h w a y

t h e a c c e s s would c o m e i n t o the p r o p e r t y ?
T h e v e h i c l e a c c e s s is a t t h i s p o i n t w h e r e
the section

Sawmill

line, and i t ' s o n e m i l e to the n o r t h

is still in e x i s t e n c e , and l e a v e s

17

a c c e s s for the r a n c h e r s to get o n t o t h i s a r e a from t h e

18

old h i g h w a y , w h i c h w a s replaced b y t h e I n t e r s t a t e

19
20
21

system.

A n d this is n o w the only v e h i c u l a r r o a d that is used
b y t h e G i l l m o r s to g e t into t h i s
Qt

area.

A n d the w i t n e s s h a s m a r k e d

o n E x h i b i t 8P an X

22

n e a r t h e I n t e r s t a t e , w h i c h w o u l d b e w h e r e y o u take o f f to

23

g o o n t h e p r i v a t e road, and an X w h i c h s h o w s e n t r y

24

the Sawmill

25

A.

onto

Property.

W e l l , an e x i t o n t o t h e old road a t E c h o

Junction,

26

a n d t r a v e l in a p a r a l l e l f o r m a t i o n to the n e w I n t e r s t a t e

27

up this distance

28
29
no

from Echo J u n c t i o n to t h i s p o i n t .

T h e n t h e r e ' s a locked g a t e , and M r . W r i g h t h a s a
c o r r a l , e t c e t e r a , at this p o i n t and a l o c k e d

gate.

A n d the G i l l m o r s have a d e c r e e e a s e m e n t t o travel
EDWARD P. MIDGLEY, RPR
A J37 COURTS iUILOlNG
SALT LAHC CITY. UTAH I4U1

jl O *

//^
^

329

1

this mile across the Wright property onto the Sawmill

2I

Property.

31

p.

After you get onto the Sawmill Property, can you

4

indicate to the best of your knowledge the vehicular road

8

that is available?

•

A.

Y e s . The road continues u p — o r i g i n a l l y it was

M

about into this area.

•

Gillmor Livestock in the beginning years, w e did not in-

•

corporate the use of the eight sections in our operation.

W

And at the time they were operating

This w a s a trade-off lease with Bamberger

11

Investment

Company with lands incorporated into the Park City area.

12

And due to water development, et cetera they dropped

13

the lease.

14

go in there and see what I could d o with the water thing

15

and see if we could get a lease.

16

And so Uncle Ed at that time asked if I would

So, at that time I went into the area, and where the

17I

road ended at a large spring, a natural spring that is up

18

from this red X to the north, oh, gosh, about a quarter

19

of a mile, w a s the end of the present road at that time.

20

i hired some equipment to come in there, and we built

21

a road on up into the basin area, which would be about

22

where their red X would be, and again t o — w a t e r develop-

23

ments in the area,
Q.

24

and—.

Just a moment, now. For the purpose of the

25

record it's very difficult, Mr. Gillmor.

26

— i

27

That's where the spring was located.

28

by the spring?

n

You have placed

the bottom portion of the property placed a small X.
Would you put an S

2i)

A.

This is just an approximation.

:tt)

0-

I understand.

I
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1

A.

It's colored o v e r .

21

0-

Then, t h e road.

Would y o u trace the road to

J

t h e b e s t o f your k n o w l e d g e from w h e r e it e n t e r s t h e lands

4

u p t h r o u g h t h e spring u p to what y o u call the b a s i n ?

M

8

A.

W e l l , t h e best I c a n — t h a t ' s r e l a t i v e l y right.

*

Q.

Would y o u p u t a B by t h e basin? w h a t y o u ' v e

l\

called the basin?

8

t h e e n d of the roadway, or is there m o r e roadway in t h e

•

property?

|

A.

Is that nov; to t h e b e s t of your k n o w l e d g ^

No, this is not the end.

There are roads, un-

11

i m p r o v e d r o a d s that go up these c a n y o n s o f f to the e a s t

12

a n d w o r k u p o n t o t h e ridge l i n e s .

13

t h e r e ' s a r e a s o n a b l e grade and e l e v a t i o n g r a d e .

14

t h e e n d of t h e road.

15

A n d — b u t this is w h e r e
There is

F r o m this p o i n t on, going into these c a n y o n s to the

1C

e a s t , it's very steep and very d i f f i c u l t to g e t o u t onto

17

the ridge lines.

18

Q.

W h e n y o u refer to the b a s i n w h e r e the B is, y o u

19

then s a y there a r e s o m e — w h a t type of r o a d s ; four-wheel

20

drive vehicle roads?

21

A.

These a r e - - t h i s is a road similar to those we've

22

just d e s c r i b e d a s Sixth East.

23

an o r d i n a r y p i c k u p , if necessary.

24

h a v e a f o u r - w h e e l d r i v e , b u t from this p o i n t - - .

25
26

Q.

Y o u could g e t u p here w i t h
It's m o r e d e s i r a b l e to

W h e n y o u say "this p o i n t , " y o u ' v e g o t to d e -

s c r i b e it f o r the record.

27

A.

From t h e basin area to t h e e a s t and o u t onto

28

t h e r i d g e area, that's necessary d e f i n i t e l y to have a

29

four-wheel drive vehicle,

•to

ft

S o w h e n you first started in t h e operation, as
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1

I understand it, this land was not used by the Gillmor

2

Livestock Company as a part of its operation?

4

A.

N o . It was a trade-off with the Bambergers on

4

the lease.

And I went u p and hired this equipment to go

5

in, and w e started developing the springs and the roadways.

•

And at that time, w e first leased the ground, or it

M

w a s leased, by way of my contract with the one operator.

*
9 J
10

Then he operated for one year.

The the second year

it was leased to the Porter brothers.

They operated for

two years.

11

Then we used it subsequently after that and developed

12

fencing, et cetera in the area.

13

Bur during this period of time that the two first

14

operators were on, the time was when the bulk of the

15

springs were developed and made accessible for grazing use

16

of the land.

17
18

ft

Would you indicate, please, on the exhibit the

source of water of which you're aware?

19

k

I'd like to g e t my old m a p that I had where I

20

marked those springs, and I think I could d o a better job

2

of plotting them.

*1

22

23 J

MR. LEE:

All right.

Mark these areas of water with

a W, if y o u would, please.

24)

A.

I'll mark this one W-l on Thirty Five Canyon.

25

That w a s t h e r e — t h e s e were the ones w e developed with

26

large equipment.

27 I

The Thirty Five Canyon is a livestock access to be

28

able to bring a herd of sheep from this point of the Inter-

29

state.

;

K>

ft

"This point of the Interstate;" you're going to
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A 317 COURTS t U I L O t N G
SALT LAKE ClTV UTAH 14111

^ -j -j

1

have to tell us where that i s .

2

A.

L e t m e mark it with an X. This is clearly d e -

31

fined on the m a p as Thirty Five Canyon across Section 3 5 ,

4I

and we were able to let sheep work their w a y up through

6

this cliffy or very steep area to where it opened up about

6

into here.

7

So, this w a s o n e livestock access in Thirty Five

8

Canyon.

91

development in the area.

10

Q.

And there w a s water serving that prior to any

N o w , you've indicated on 8P with a circle and

11 J

a W those spots where you believe there are sources of

12I

water; is that correct?

13

A.

Yes, those are areas where we went in with a

14

backhoe and d u g the springs out and tilled them out and

15

troughed or ponded them as the case w a s .

1G

ft

You've indicated that there is a n access for

17

sheep.

18

Sawmill Property.

This would be in the southeast portion of the

19

When you were operating in the partnership, and were

20

utilizing this ground for leasing, what type of operation

21

did you run on the Sawmill Property?

22

A.

When this w a s leased to the two operators prior

23

to our usage, it w a s operated with sheep only.

24

access w a s used at that time.

25
26
27
28

And this

When Gillmor Livestock used this property, w e operated
this with cattle and sheep, too, later o n ,
Q.

What's the latest time you've been u p on the

property, M r . Gillmor?

2<j

A.

Last summer,

ui

Q.

M r . Gillmor, I refer you to Defendants' Exhibit
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1

58D and ask you if you are familiar with the proposed

21

division of the Sawmill Property as shown on that exhibit?

3]

A.

Yes, I have seen it.

4

Q

There happens to be on the exhibit the appearance

5

of a little hole and then a small piece of property over

6

to the left.

T

A.

Could you explain what that is?

This piece of property exhibited by the green

8

square in Parcel 2 is owned by another person.

9

40 acre plot in the area of the basin as referred to

10
11
12
13

It's a

earlier.
0.

And the little plot over to the left that's num-

bered 3?
A.

This is a parcel of Gillmor lands that I've not

14

been upon owned by another party prior to Gillmor's pur-

15

chase.

16

time I was a partner in Gillmor Livestock, but I have never

17

been on this piece of land.

18
19
20
21
22
23

0-

Gillmors purchased this piece of land during the

Do you know whether or not that land has been

utilized by Gillmor Livestock, Mr. Edward
A.

I don't know.

Gillmor?

To my knowledge it hasn't.

We

never utilized it during the time I operated it.
Qt

Taking a look at Defendants' Exhibit 58D, does

the division appear to be in equal quantity?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Qt

Based upon your experience with that property

26

and the knowledge of its use, do you have an opinion as to

27

whether or not the suggested division is equal in quality

28

and quantity?

29
30

A.

Well, I think it would be as equal as it could

possibly be divided as far as quality is concerned, and
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1

certainly exactly equal in quantity.

2

ft

With respect to the various parcels, if a di-

8

vision were to be made by this Court, would it be neces

*

sary to have access up the road you've referred to across

8

the various parcels?

1

e

Would that access have to be avail-

able to all parties?

7

A.

Definitely so.

The topography is so steep and

8

rugged in the rear portion of this it is the only vehicle

9

access onto the area.

10

So, very definitely, this access would be—have to

11

be left open for all parties to make use of the parcel.

12

MR. LEE:

No further questions of this witness.

13
14

CROSS-EXAMINATION
|

15

BY MR. CLEGG

Q.

Mr. Gillmor, as one drives up the canyon from

1GJ

Echo there's some sheer red cliffs on the north side of

17

the road.

181

relationship to the entrance of this property?

19

A.

Can you identify where those cliffs are with

Yeah, they're in the general vicinity—many

20

years ago when the old highway come out, there was a big

21

overhanging sandstone cliff.

221

under it.

23 J

seen that "prop that held the mountain up" there.

24
25

26
27

They used to put a prop

This is just above that.

I think we've all

This is the first opening above those sheer sandstone
cliffs; the first gate and corral area above that where
you go in.
&

And presently there's a rest station and informa-

28

tion station between Evanston and Echo.

29

near this property?

:t()

A.

Is that anywhere

Yes, that's above it; yes.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FLORENCE GILLMOR, STEPHEN T.
GILLMOR, and CHARLES F.
GILLMOR,

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
vs.
EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR and
GILLMOR LIVESTOCK CORPORATION,

Consolidated Case Nos.
C-81-3875
C-82-3490
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.

THE ORDER, dated November 14, 1984, requiring EDWARD
LESLIE GILLMOR to appear and show cause why he should not be held
in contempt of court for violating the judgment and permanent injunction entered herein on November 7, 1983, by permitting his
livestock to graze on land leased by STEPHEN T. GILLMOR, and why
he should not pay damages, attorneys fees, and court costs, and
THE ORDER, dated November 27, 1984, requiring STEPHEN T. GILLMOR
to appear and show cause why he should not be held in contempt of
court for violating the same judgment and permanent injunction by
permitting his sheep to graze on the land of EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOl,

T?VTTTnTm

^

*ft4 «*/ hm should dot pay damages, attorneys fees, and court costs!,
came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable J. Dennis

1

Frederick on March 19, 1985; and the court having heard and considered the evidence adduced by the parties on the respective
claims of the parties relating to contempt and for damages and
attorneys fees, and being fully advised in the premises, now makes
the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

This court made and entered a judgment and perman-

ent injunction in the above entitled consolidated cases, dated
November 7, 1983, permanently restraining EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR,
GILLMOR LIVESTOCK CORPORATION, their agents, servants, employees,
and attorneys, ft....from entering upon with livestock or grazing
livestock upon the lands referred to as the Old Ranch, Improved
and Sub-Irrigated East of the Sewage Canal, and upon any lands
leased or possessed by STEPHEN T. GILLMOR, and upon any lands
awarded to FLORENCE GILLMOR or CHARLES F. GILLMOR in the Judgment
and Decree of Partition of February 14, 1981, as amended, in Civil]
No. 223998 as set forth in Exhibit A attached hereto, with the ex A
ception that use is permitted of all roadway easements, stock
trails, and footway easements established in the said Judgment ana
Decree of Partition.'1
2.

The Court, in the sane Judgment and Permanent In-

junction, similarly permanently restrained and enjoined STEPHEN
T. GILLMOR, together with his agents, servants, employees, and
-2-

attorneys fron entering upon with livestock or grazing livestock \
upon any of the lands awarded to EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR by the
above-mentioned Judgment and Decree with the same exception.
3.

The above-mentioned Exhibit A describes approxi-

mately 33,000 acres of land in Salt Lake, Tooele, and Summit
Counties, comprising 17 blocks, which include some 64 separately
described parcels.

The parcels in each of the 17 blocks are ad-

jacent to other parcels in the same block.

The boundaries of the

separate parcels are, for the most part, unfenced, although both
STEPHEN T. GILLMOR and EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR are presently
engaged in fencing boundaries of the separate parcels to avoid
commingling of livestock and trespassing.
4.

The above-mentioned Judgment and Decree of Parti-

tion, dated February 14, 1981, was appealed to the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah, and did not become final until December 3,
1982.
5.

There have been numerous incidents in the year

1984 of STEPHEN T. GILLMOR1S sheep grazing on land owned by
EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR, and numerous incidents in the year 1984 of
EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR'S cattle and sheep grazing on parcels of
land owned by FLORENCE GILLMOR and CHARLES F. GILLMOR and leased
from them by STEPHEN T. GILLMOR, but the proof has not been clear
and convincing that each party had the ability to comply strictly
with the Judgment and Permanent Injunction and that each party had
willfully and knowingly violated such Judgment and Permanent
-3-

tmjimett**.

Tb* court furtb*r finds that o«ltb«r party !•

\

entitled to damages or attorneys fees against the other.- From thel\
foregoing Findings of Fact the Court draws the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

i

1.
Neither EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR or STEPHEN T. GILLMORj
is guilty of contempt of court.
2.

Each of the above-mentioned orders to show cause

should be dismissed and no judgment should be entered for damages,
attorneys fees, or costs of court.

DATED this

Qfl^ay

•4-

of

WV \

THIScV / *" DAY C

' 1985
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